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ABSTRACT

Under the guise of a non-verbal problem solving experiment
eighty subjects observed a "real life" accident involving two stimulus
persons.

By manipulating the severity of outcome (mild or severe) as

well as who was hurt (actor or bystander) four accident situations
were created.

Cognitive processes employed to "explain" the occurrence

of the accident were investigated within the context of "the belief in
a just world" and seIf-protective attribution of responsibility formula
tions.

It was found that observers differentially rated the stimulus

persons across experimental conditions and that derrogation of the
perpetrator occurred when his actions resulted in injury to an innocent
bystander.

The other major finding, that attribution of responsibility

to a similar stimulus person who perpetrated the event decreased while
attribution of responsibility to a "third party" increased in severe
outcome conditions was discussed within the framework of defensive
attribution.

An alternative mode of "explaining" an accident, misper-

ceiving the event, was identified and discussed.

INTRODUCTION

When an observer witnesses an unfortunate accident, how does
he perceive and account for the events which occur to others around
him?

Under what conditions will an observer feel sympathy and com

passion for a suffering victim and under what conditions will he
reject, or at least blame, those who are unfortunate?

Under what

conditions will observers assign responsibility to those persons
potentially at fault for an accident?

Will an observer come to terms

with the suffering of an innocent bystander in the same manner as he
comes to terms with the suffering of a victim who brought about his
own fate?

Perhaps because of the implications for the judicial pro

cess and the processes of person perception in the last few years,
investigators have shown increasing interest in these questions
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 1973).
Heider's (1958) work on person perception and attribution of
responsibility has served as the basis for research on these ques
tions.

The basic attribution process refers to the means by which

people form interpretations or make assumptions about the causes of
events around them.

Kanouse and Hanson (1972) suggest that, in

general, the attribution process seems to serve an individual's need
to make sense of his social world.

When a perceiver observes a

specific event he must often engage in the cognitive task of estab
lishing "sufficient reason" for that action.
1

By attributing
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characteristics, intentions, feelings, and traits to objects within
his social world, the perceiver can answer the question "Why did this
happen?"

Attribution then, is the basic process by which a perceiver

"explains" the occurrence of events in his world.
Two alternative theoretical positions have been formulated in
an attempt to spell out the cognitive processes which will lead to
various reactions on the part of an observer who witnesses an accident.
The first of these positions, "self-protective attribution" was
formulated by Walster (1966) and has focused on how observers attri
bute responsibility for an accident.

The other position is based on

Lerner's (1965) concept of "the belief in a just world" and has
focused on how observers alter their perceptions of accident victims.
While both formulations are highly similar, there are important dis
tinctions between the two.
Walster (1966) proposed the hypothesis that as the conse
quences of an accident become more severe, greater responsibility for
the event will be assigned to some appropriate person, often the
victim.

More specifically, she proposed that when an observer wit

nesses an accident which results in a mild outcome he will reason that
he could very easily have been involved in a similar set of circum
stances.

Therefore, the observer will attribute the cause of the

event to "chance."

Chance is a sufficient reason to explain the

occurrence of the accidental event.

Thus, Walster maintained that

under these conditions the observer will often feel sympathy and
compassion for the victim.

Since "chance" adequately explains the

3

occurrence of the event the observer will attribute little responsi
bility to those involved as he goes on his way thinking "too bad" or
"tough break."
However, when an observer witnesses an accident which results
in a serious outcome he will not be inclined to attribute the cause
of the event to chance.

If the observer did this, it would carry the

threatening implication that an accident of equal magnitude could
perhaps happen to him.

In order to protect himself from this thought

the observer will attribute the cause of the event to some appropriate
person who will be held responsible.

By emphasizing the "different

ness" of the person the observer can "protect" himself and insulate
himself from the thought that he could be involved in a similar
catastrophe.
In order to test this hypothesis Walster (1966) asked subjects
to listen to tape recorded descriptions of an accident which involved
an average high school student who parked his car at

the top of a hill.

After the student left his car, the brake cable snapped and the car
began to roll down the hill.

Waleter created four experimental condi

tions by varying the severity of the outcome.

In one set of conditions

the car fender was dented (mild outcome) or the car was completely
destroyed (severe outcome).

In the other set of conditions others

could have been involved (mild outcome) or others were involved as a
result of being hit by the car (severe outcome).

Consistent with

Walster's expectations it was found

that across both conditions

greater responsibility was assigned

to the car owner when the
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consequences were

severe than when they were mild.

In a subsequent study, Walster (1967) was unable to replicate
her earlier finding that the attribution of responsibility was depen
dent upon the severity of the outcome.

This subsequent study was

comprised of two experiments which both followed the same general
design.
home.

Subjects were told of a stimulus person who had purchased a
As a result of an environmental change over which he had no

control (a mudslide) he had gained or lost varying amounts of money
on the investment.

After the subjects heard of this incident they

were asked to assess the responsibility of the stimulus person for the
gain or loss, and were asked to estimate their own confidence that they
would have anticipated the eventual outcome.
In the first experiment of this study there were significant
findings which contradicted Walster's previous study.

The homeowner

was assigned less responsibility when the gain or loss was substan
tial (severe outcome) than when it was inconsequential (mild outcome).
The results of the second experiment were even more confusing since
there was no systematic relationship between the attribution
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responsibility and the severity of the outcome.
Shaver (1970) attempted to reinterpret these contradictory
findings by proposing the notion that an important prerequisite for
the occurrence of seIf-protective attribution of responsibility is
the possibility that the same accident could happen to the perceiver.
The existence of this possibility was denoted as "relevance" and
Shaver maintained that two important preconditions which effect
relevance are "situational relevance" and "personal similarity" to
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the stimulus person.

Shaver reasoned that in the absence of these

preconditions there would be little or no threat to an observer and
consequently, there would be no need for him to assign responsibility.
Shaver reasoned that in Walster's (1966) original study the
situation of an accident involving a high school student was highly
relevant to a college sophomore.

However, in Walster's (1967) sub

sequent study which involved a homeowner, situational relevance was
low since very few college sophomores own their own homes.

In addi

tion, personal similarity to the stimulus person was lower in the
subsequent study since the homeowner was described as an older person.
To test the notion that personal similarity to the stimulus
person effects attribution of responsibility, Shaver conducted three
experiments.

In the first experiment subjects were presented with an

altered version of the condition formulated by Walster (1966) in which
the high school student's car was completely destroyed.

Half of the

subjects were asked to assume that the victim's personal characteris
tics were very similar to their own and the other half of the subjects
were asked to assume that the victim's personal characteristics were
very dissimilar to their own.

However, contradictory to his expecta

tions, Shaver found that less responsibility was assigned to a similar
stimulus person than to a dissimilar stimulus person.
In the second experiment conducted within this study Shaver
manipulated similarity to the victim by varying the stimulus person's
age.

Across experimental conditions, Shaver found that heightened

similarity to the stimulus person again lessened the perceiver's
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attribution of responsibility and increased the ascriptions of careful
ness to the stimulus person.
Another similar finding was obtained by Shaver in the third
experiment in this study.

Shaver presented subjects with a written

case history under the guise of a simulated jury study.

The subjects

were told that the case deliberation they were about to read had
actually been brought to trial but that a mistrial was declared since
the jury was unable to reach a verdict.
The actual case involved injury to a child who was attending
the open house of a research and development firm with his parents.
The stimulus person was a mechanical engineer who was demonstrating
the use of a tensile strength machine.

After inserting an alloy

sample into the machine he was called away to answer a phone call.
While out of the room the alloy sample broke apart violently and a
metal splinter lodged itself in the child's wrist (mild outcome) or
in the child's eye causing permanent blindness (severe outcome).
The means for responsibility attributed to the perpetrator
(the technician) failed to obtain severity-dependent attribution.
fact, there was a moderate trend in the opposite direction.

In

This

apparent reluctance to assign responsibility in the severe condition
occurred despite differences in the perceived severity of the acci
dental outcome.

However, the severe accident was seen as less fore

seeable than the mild accident.

In addition, the subjects perceived

the stimulus person as being more careful wben the outcome was severe
than when the outcome was mild.
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Shaver (1970) concluded that while a certain amount of "rele
vance" may be necessary for the instigation of self-protective attri
bution of responsibility, the threshold appears to be low.

Once the

stimulus person becomes highly similar to the perceiver, denials of
responsibility and ascriptions of carefulness may be employed to avoid
the negative outcome.

Shaver (1970) termed this category of perceiver

response "defensive attribution."
The results of a study conducted by McKillip and Posovac
(1972)

demonstrate the notion of defensive attribution.

These inves

tigators varied the severity of outcome as well as the similarity of
attitudes between the subject and the victim of an accident.

All sub

jects read a "case history" of an automobile driver who was involved
in an accident.

It was found that for dissimilar subjects greater

responsibility was attributed to the stimulus person when he suffered
severe personal injury and caused extensive damage to city property
(severe outcome) and that less responsibility was attributed to the
dissimilar stimulus person when he suffered mild personal injury (mild
outcome).

On the other hand, the opposite was true for a similar

stimulus person.

That is, when asked to rate a victim who was re

ported to hold similar attitudes, less responsibility was assigned
for the severe outcome and more responsibility was assigned for the
mild outcome.

Apparently, when the stimulus person was reported to

hold similar attitudes the threshold of similarity was passed.

These

results were interpreted by McKillip and Posovac to support Shaver's
notion of defensive attribution.
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However, at this juncture it is difficult to evaluate the
hypothesis that attribution of responsibility will increase with the
severity of outcome.

Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen (1973) have

pointed out that much of the research in this area is based more on
speculation and intuitive hypotheses than on a systematic analysis of
the attribution process.
These inconsistent and contradictory findings may be due to
other factors as well.

For example, while purporting to replicate

previous research, studies have employed different accidental situa
tions.

They have provided subjects with varying amounts of informa

tion about the stimulus person.

They have presented the "case

histories" under different ruberics (E.G., jury studies, court cases,
impression formation, etc.), and different modes of presentation have
been used (E.G., tape recorded descriptions or printed booklets).
Partly in an attempt to understand these conflicting findings
investigators have obtained additional measures designed to assess
the subjects' perceptions of the hypothetical situations.

Thus, sub

jects have been asked whether the victim had been careless, whether
he was conscientious, whether he could have foreseen the consequences,
etc.

Unfortunately, the use of these questions has shed little light

on the attribution of responsibility and no consistent patterns have
been obtained (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1973).
Although the data are certainly inconclusive, Walster’s theo
retical notion still retains plausibility, due to its similarity to
other formulations.

The other theoretical formulation which appears
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to be equally plausable is the "just world" hypothesis developed by
Lerner and his colleagues (Lerner, 1965; Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Lerner
and Matthews, 1967).

Lerner has proposed that people are inclined to

believe in a "just world," a world in which people get what they
deserve and, conversely, deserve what they get, based upon their
actions.

According to this formulation, if something unpleasant

happens to an individual he is seen as deserving it for one of three
reasons:

(a) because he is an intrinsically evil person and his

character merits the fate; (b) because he has behaved in a specific
and direct manner to bring about the bad outcome; or (c) chance.
An observer is able to tolerate viewing an accident which
results in minor outcomes because there is little threat to his belief
in a just world.

When an observer witnesses the victim of a mild

accident he is usually able to ascribe some misdeed to him, or ascribe
the consequence to chance.

Therefore, the observer can maintain his

belief in a just world since the victim got what he deserved based on
his actions or chance.

The observer can cognitively reason, "He

should have been looking" or "He should have known better."

In this

situation social justice has been restored.
However, when an observer witnesses a severe accident and he
cannot ascribe the suffering to some misdeed or chance, the belief in
a "just world" is threatened.

The possibility that one can suffer a

severe accident without somehow being responsible is socially unjust.
This is an unfair situation and the observer feels uncomfortable espe
cially when he knows that the suffering will continue or that he is
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unable to alter the victim's fate.

In order for the observer to

restore his belief in a just world he will derrogate the victim by
viewing him as a bad or undesirable person who deserves to suffer.
Thus, in this way social justice can be restored.

An extension of this

formulation is that an observer will in turn assign more responsibility
to a victim who suffers severe consequences by virtue of the victim's
undesirable character.

Thus, the observer can restore social justice

by maintaining the cognition, "He deserved his fate and he is respon
sible for it because he is a bad and undesirable person."
One example of this cognitive process was quoted by Michner
(1971).

Following the tragic shooting of four college students at

Kent State a high school teacher was quoted as saying that the slain
students deserved to die.

This teacher added that, "Anyone who

walked the streets of Kent with long hair and dirty clothes deserves
to be shot."

Apparently, by derrogating these students and viewing

them as "bad" or "undesirable" people who deserved their fate, the
teacher was able to restore her belief in a "just world."
Lerner and Simmons (1966) demonstrated this notion when they
asked subjects to observe emotional cues of a peer (the victim) who
was participating in a paired associate learning task.

The victim, as

a result of making the usual errors, appeared to suffer from severe
and painful electric shocks which served as a negative reinforcement.
In describing the suffering victim after these observations, the
subjects rejected and devalued her when they believed that they would
continue to see her suffer or when they were unable to alter the
victim's fate.
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These results were interpreted to support the hypothesis that
rejection and devaluation of the victim were primarily based on the
observer's need to believe in a "just world."

In this study the

victim's actions (making expected errors) did not merit the fate
(suffering severe shocks).

Since no misdeed could be ascribed to the

victim, observers develued her and convinced themselves that she
deserved her fate on the basis of being an undesirable person.
A further test of Lerner's just world hypothesis was con
structed by Costelloe and Prestholdt (1973).

In this study each

observer believed that he was the only eyewitness to a live accident
in which a perpetrator examined expensive electronic equipment.

As a

result of this action the perpetrator received an electric shock
(severe outcome) or was not hurt (mild outcome).

Consistent with

their expectations, observers who viewed the severe outcome condi
tion devalued the victim by viewing him less favorably than did the
observers who viewed the mild outcome condition.

In addition, the

stimulus person who suffered the severe outcome was seen as more de
serving of a monetary punishment than the stimulus person who
suffered the mild outcome.
These results were interpreted as further support for the just
w o l

Id hypothesis.

Apparently, when the victim was not hurt a socially

just situation existed.

However, when the victim was hurt his actions

(examining the equipment) did not merit his fate (receiving the shock).
Thus, in order to restore their belief in a just world observers derrogated the victim when he suffered the severe outcome.

In this situation,
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the victim was seen as deserving his fate by virtue of being a "bad"
and "undesirable" person.
The studies conducted on the just world hypothesis have gen
erally yielded a more consistent pattern of results than studies con
ducted on the attribution of responsibility.

One reason for this

difference may be that the two formulations have employed different
methodologies.

While researchers conducting studies on the attribution

of responsibility have asked subjects to read written case histories
of hypothetical events reported to have happened in the past, Lerner
and his colleagues have had the subjects serve as observers of "real
life" events.

Therefore, while subjects in the attribution of respon

sibility studies have had to guess about outcomes and the actual
events which were reported to have taken place, Lerner's subjects were
able to personally experience the events.
There are also other important differences between the two
formulations.

One different ; is the stimulus person which was rated.

While the research conducted on the attribution of responsibility has
focused on the perpetrator of the accident, the research conducted on
the just world hypothesis has focused on the victim of the accident.
Thus, the stimulus persons are different.

Each theory focuses on one

stimulus person but in one case the stimulus person is the perpetrator
of the accident, in the other case the stimulus person is the victim
of the accident.
Another important difference between the two formulations is
the dependent measure employed.

While the studies conducted on the
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attribution of responsibility have manipulated the severity of outcome
and then collected measures of responsibility attributed to the
stimulus person, studies conducted on the just world hypothesis have
manipulated the consequence to the victim and then collected measures
of person perception.
Furthermore, it is plausable that Walster's notion of selfprotective attribution of responsibility and Lerner's "belief in a just
world" are not competing explanations but are, in fact, two separate
and distinct modes which observers may employ in order to come to terms
with an accident.

Thus, an observer could attempt to protect himself

by attributing responsibility to the perpetrator and/or derrogate the
victim thereby restoring his belief in a just world.

By engaging in

either of these cognitive processes the observer may be able to
"explain" the occurrence of the accident.
It is also conceivable that a third possibility exists which
would enable an observer to "explain" the occurrence of an accident.
Specifically, by misperceiving the event or the actors behavior,
observers may be able to reconstruct the actual event in an eyewitness
account as they would have liked it to have happened.

This mode of

coming to terms with an accident has received little or no attention in
the literature on attribution processes.
The present study was designed in an attempt to systematically
investigate whatever cognitive processes are employed by observers in
order to explain the occurrence of an accident.

To do this, Walster's

(1966) notion of self-protective attribution of responsibility, Shaver's
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(1970) notion of defensive attribution, Lerner's (1965) belief in a
just world, as well as eyewitness accounts of the accident were all
under investigation as possible explanations of the attribution
process.
In order to investigate these various processes four accidental
situations were created in such a way that each observer believed that
he was the only eyewitness to observe a "real world" accident.

It was

expected that by providing a "real life" situation the observer's
need to engage in attribution processes would be aroused to a greater
extent than if they simply read a case history of an accident.

A

real world situation also provided an opportunity to collect a number
of dependent measures on different aspects of the accident so that a
more complete picture could be provided.
A major purpose of this study was to provide a more complete
picture of the processes employed by subjects to "explain" an accident.
Thus, the subjects in the present study observed and evaluated two
stimulus persons.

One stimulus person was an innocent bystander

and the other was the actor who perpetrated the accident.

By mani

pulating the severity of outcome (mild or severe) as well as who
was hurt (actor or bystander) the present study served as a conceptual
replication of studies on self protective attribution of responsibility
as well as on the just world hypothesis.
In addition, the present study extended the research on the
just world hypothesis by collecting person perception measures on both
the innocent bystander and the perpetrator.

At the same time, the
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present study extended the self-protective attribution of responsibil
ity research by collecting measures of responsibility attributed to
the perpetrator as well as the bystander.

By collecting these depen

dent variables the present study was able to provide a test of inter
actions which may occur between the two formulations.
In addition, since Walster (1966) raised the possibility that
in certain situations there may be a tendency on the part of observers
to attribute responsibility to a "third party" potentially at fault
but not directly involved in an accident, measures of responsibility
attributed to a third party (the experimenter) were also collected in
this study.

Following her original hypothesis Walster suggested that

greater responsibility would be attributed to a third party as the
severity of outcome increased.

However, this possibility has not been

previously investigated.
In the present study, then, the subjects observed a situation
in which an actor inspected expensive electronic equipment.

In one set

of conditions the actor hurt himself as a result of this action and
suffered from a mild electric shock (self-mild outcome condition) or
the actor hurt himself and suffered from a severe electric shock (selfsevere outcome condition).

In the other set of conditions the actor

hurt the bystander who suffered from the mild electric shock (other-mild
outcome condition) or the actor hurt the bystander who suffered from
the severe electric shock (other-severe outcome condition).
After the subject had observed one of the accidental outcomes
the person perception measures were collected on both stimulus persons
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and measures of responsibility attributed to each of those persons
potentially at fault for the accident were collected.

The observers'

eyewitness accounts of the accident were tape recorded along with the
responses to several specific questions about the accident.
Any predictions made in this study are necessarily tenuous,
since they are based on theoretical statements which are incomplete
and in early stages of development.

Therefore, these statements are

serving as "functional theories" which guide rather than specify the
predictions of this study.
The hypotheses of the present study fall into three major cate
gories.

The first category deals with measures of responsibility attri

buted to the stimulus persons.

The second category deals with the

observers' perceptions of the stimulus persons.

The final category

deals with the observers' eyewitness accounts of the accident.

Attribution of Responsibility
(a) Based on Walster's (1966) notion of self protective attribution
of responsibility it was predicted that as the consequences of
the outcome became more severe greater degrees of responsibility
would be attributed to those persons potentially at fault for
the accident.

More specifically, it was predicted that

observers would attribute more responsibility to the actor
and to the bystander in the severe outcome condition than in
the mild outcome condition.
(b) By extending Walster's hypothesis of self-protective attribu
tion of responsibility it was also predicted that more
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responsibility would be attributed to a third party (the
experimenter) potentially at fault for the accident in the
severe outcome condition than in the mild outcome condition.

Person Perception
(c)

Based on Lerner's (1965) just world hypothesis it was pre
dicted that as the consequences of the outcome became
severe observers would derogate the stimulus persons.

more
More

specifically, it was predicted that observers would perceive
both the actor and the bystander less favorably in the
severe outcome conditions than in the mild outcome conditions.
(d)

By applying Lerner's just world hypothesis to the present
study it was expected that when the bystander was not hurt
observers would perceive this as a just situation.

However,

when the bystander was injured as a result of the actor's
action it was expected that observers would perceive tnis as
an unjust situation.

Thus, it was predicted that when the

innocent bystander was injured observers would attempt to
restore their belief in a just world by derogating the by
stander and by perceiving him less favorably than when he was
not hurt.
(e) Assuming that a just world situation applied to the actor it
was expected that when the actor hurt himself, observers
might perceive this as a just situation since the actor got
what he deserved based on his actions.

However, it was pre

dicted that when the actor's actions resulted in injury to
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the bystander this might be perceived as a socially unjust
situation.

Therefore, it was predicted that when the actor

hurt the bystander he would also be derogated and viewed
less favorably than when he hurt himself.
(f) In addition, it was predicted that since the actor's actions
always resulted in injury to someone he would be perceived
less favorably than the bystander across all treatment condi
tions .

Eyewitness Account
(g) Based on a previous study conducted by Costelloe and Prestholdt
(1973), it was predicted that when the outcome of the accident
was severe observers would give more detailed and accurate
descriptions of the event than when the outcome was mild.

METHOD

Subjects
The subjects were 80 college sophomores enrolled in introduc
tory psychology courses at Louisiana State University.
were equally divided by sex.
credit for his participation.

The subjects

Each subject received extra course
When the subjects were recruited the

experimenter informed the class that they had been randomly selected
to serve as observers in a non-verbal problem experiment while the
students in two other classes had been selected to serve as the
participants who would engage in the actual puzzle assembly task.
To insure the welfare and protection of the subjects the
Director of Student Health Services screened the medical records of
each volunteer.

Those volunteers with high blood pressure, heart con

ditions or severe emotional problems were not used in this study.
Furthermore, each subject was observed at all times during his partici
pation in this study.

Procedure
Each subject reported to the experimental room individually.
When the subject arrived the experimenter introduced himself and intro
duced the subject to his assistant who was working in a small room
across the hall.

The experimenter then provided the subject with the

following rationale for the experiment:
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I am interested in correlating the time it takes
two people to solve a
problem withthe number of non
verbal cues they use to communicate with each other.
In this case the problem will be the assembly of a
cardboard puzzle (pointing to puzzle). Also, I want
to see if observers can objectively record these non
verbal cues which they observe. Your task will be to
serve as an observer and to record the cues on this
non-verbal checklist.
The experimenter then
in this room and informed the

wrote an "A"and "B" on a blackboard
subject thatthe participant who

sat

on the left was to be referred to as "A" and the participant sitting
on the right was to be referred to as "B."
After answering any questions about the checklist (Appendix
A) the experimenter pointed out a one way mirror on the wall and
conducted the subject to an observation room where he turned on a
T.V. camera situated behind this mirror.

The experimenter then

pointed to the camera cables which lead to a T.V. monitor in which
the subject could now view the experimental room and the "A" and "B"
which the experimenter had just written on the blackboard.

The experi

menter then handed the subject a set of earphones and stated:
Since the participants are not aware that they
are being observed it is important that you remain in
this room. I will return here when we are done to
collect your non-verbal checklist and at that time I
would like you to record your impressions of the
participants, so please stay here until I return.
Remember, I don't want them to know about you.
Following a knock on the door the experimenter left apparently
to conduct the experiment while the subject remained in this room
watching the T. V. monitor.

In actuality, what the subject viewed

was one of four pre-recorded video tapes.

The video tape deck was
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set up and run by the experimenter.

The experimenter's assistant who

collected the dependent measures was always blind as to which tape the
subject viewed.
All four video tapes began with the experimenter entering the
experimental room with a participant (referred to as the actor or A).
The experimenter then introduced himself and stated;
Your name is Tom,right? (checks name off list)
Another student is scheduled to be here in a minute.
When he arrives I will explain your task.
A sat down at a table in the center of this room and examined
the pieces of the puzzle on this table.

After a short time he turned

his chair around and intently looked at some of the equipment in this
room.

This equipment included a Skinner Box, a marble counting

apparatus, rat mazes, reaction timers and many other small pieces of
equipment.

A then focused his attention on a large electronic relay

unit which consisted of a large panel of gauges and switches connected
to an adjacent panel resembling a telephone operator's switchboard.
this point a second participant arrived (bystander or B ) .

At

The experi

menter introduced himself and introduced the two participants (A and B ) .
When they had both been seated at the table in the center of this room
they were given the following instructions;
Your task is to work together as a team to assemble
the pieces of this puzzle as quickly as possible (points
to puzzle). The only stipulation is that you cannot talk
to each other. You can use whatever non-verbal cues you
can think of to communicate to your partner.
In fact,
this is what I want you to do. Be as creative as you can
but don't communicate verbally. You will have a ten minute
limit to complete the puzzle. After you have worked for
five minutes we will take a short break and then work for
another five minutes.
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At this point B asked, "What do I do if I need a piece that
he has?"

The experimenter responded, "Point, wave your hand, do what

ever you can to let him know which piece you need."
now I see" and they began assembling the puzzle.

B stated, "O.K.,

After working for

five minutes the experimenter told A and B to stop and take a short
break.

The experimenter added, "I'm going across the hall to get

some forms I will need you to fill out when we are done.
back in a minute."

I'll be

Both participants then got up and stretched after

the experimenter had left this room.

B then turned around, leaned on

the electronic relay unit and lit a cigarette.

A then walked around

the room and then went over to the other end of this relay unit.
While B was looking the other way A started to tamper with some of
the switches on this electronic equipment.
switches and unplugged several wires.

A then flipped several

From this point on the video

tapes differed depending upon the subject's experimental condition.

Self-Mild Outcome Condition.--In this condition A plugged the
wires into different sockets and flipped several switches.

When he

flipped another switch he jumped back from the relay unit clasping
his hand appearing as though he had received a mild electric shock,
jl looked on in amazement.

The experimenter then reentered this room

and calmly took control of the situation.

Looking at B the experi

menter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment.' You can go but
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
B immediately left the room.

The experimenter then turned to
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A and asked him if he was alright.

A stated that he was O.K. but that

he had received a mild electric shock.

At this point the assistant's

shoulder appeared in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment!
I'm not sure what
happened but this guy was shocked.
It was only a mild
shock but I'm going to take him to the infirmary anyhow.
Please finish up for me.
The experimenter then left this room with A who was still
holding his hand.

After a short time,the assistant entered the observa

tion room and administered the dependent measures.

Self-Severe Outcome Condition.--In this condition A plugged
the wires into different sockets and flipped several switches.

When

he flipped another switch a flash of light and cloud of smoke emitted
from the relay unit appearing as though an electrical explosion had
occurred.

A reeled backward from the relay unit, screamed and gasped

and then knelt on the floor as though suffering from a severe electric
shock.

B looked on in amazement.

The experimenter then rushed back

into this room and took control of the situation.

Looking at B the

experimenter stated;
I'm going to stop the experiment.' You can go but
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
B immediately left the room.
though he was talking to A.

The experimenter knelt down as

At this point the assistant's shoulder

appeared in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment.' I'm not sure what
happened but this guy was shocked. It was a very severe
shock and I'm going to take him to the infirmary. Please
finish up for me.
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The experimenter then helped A walk out of the room.
limping badly.

The subject then viewed the empty room.

A was

After a short

time the experimenter's assistant entered the observation room and
administered the dependent measures.

Other-Mild Outcome Condition.--In this condition A plugged the
wires into different sockets and flipped several switches.

When he

flipped another switch B jumped back from the relay unit clasping his
hand appearing as though he had received a mild electric shock.
looked on in amazement.

A

The experimenter then reentered this room

and calmly took control of the situation.

Looking at A the experimenter

stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment! You can go but
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
A immediately left the room.
asked him if he was alright.

The experimenter turned to B and

B stated that he was O.K. but that he had

received a mild electric shock.

At this point the assistant's shoulder

appeared in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to stop the experiment! I'm not sure
what happened but this guy was shocked.
It was only
a mild shock but I'm going to take him to the infirmary
anyhow. Please finish up for me.
The experimenter then left this room with B who was still
holding his hand.

After a short time the assistant entered the obser

vation room and administered the dependent measures.

Other-Severe Outcome Condition.--In this final condition A
plugged the wires into different sockets and flipped several switches.
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When he flipped another switch a flash of light and cloud of smoke
emitted from the relay unit.

B reeled backward from the relay unit,

screamed and gasped and then knelt on the floor as though suffering
a

severe electric shock. A

looked on in amazement.

from

The experimenter

then rushed back into this room and took control of the situation.
Looking at A the experimenter stated:
I'm going to
stop the experiment!
You can go but
before you do I need you to go across the hall and ask
my assistant in the white lab coat to come here.
A immediately left the room.
though talking to B.

The experimenter knelt down as

At this point the assistant's shoulder appeared

in the T.V. monitor and the experimenter stated:
I'm going to
stop the experiment!
I'm not sure
what happened but
this guy was shocked.
It was a very
severe shock and I'm going to take him to the infirmary.
Please finish up for me.
The experimenter then helped B walk out of the room.
limping badly.

The subject then viewed the empty room.

B was

After a short

time the experimenter's assistant entered the observation room and
administered the dependent measures.
In each condition, when the experimenter's assistant entered
the observation room he walked over to the T.V. monitor and turned it
off.

He then stated to the subject:
One of the participants you were observing was hurt
and Gig is taking him to the infirmary. He asked me to
look over your non-verbal checklist and to have you fill
out the impression questionnaires even though the puzzle
wasn't completed.
I need you to fill out one of these
forms for each of the participants you observed. Remember,
"A" was sitting on the left and "B" was sitting on the
right. While you fill these out I'll look over your checklist
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in the other room.
there.

When you're done come back over

The assistant then collected the non-verbal checklist and handed
the subject the impression formation questionnaire.

The assistant then

returned to the experimental room and waited for the subject to return
there after completing these forms.

In actuality, the impression

formation questionnaire was a person perception measure designed to
assess the dispositional characteristics which the subjects attributed
to each stimulus person.
adjective scales.

This measure was composed of 16 bi-polar

Each scale was a nine-point continuum.

included in this measure were:
Desirable-Undesirable, etc.

The scales

Good-Bad, Likeable-Unlikeable,

(Appendix B ) . When the subject returned

to the experimental room the assistant collected the completed person
perception measure.
The assistant then asked the subject to give his eyewitness
account of the accident by stating, "Before he left for the infirmary
the experimenter asked me to find out as much as I could about what
happened.

You were the only one who saw what happened.

Please tell me

what happened while the experimenter was out of the room."

In

actuality, the subject's eyewitness account of the accident was tape
recorded so that independent judges could conduct a content analysis
on the reports of the accident.

Specifically, this measure was

designed to identify the cognitions, justifications and distortions
that observers employed in order to come to terms with the accident.
After the subject had given his eyewitness account of the
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accident the assistant asked several specific questions designed to
assess the subject's perceptions of the accident.

This semi-structured

interview was composed of the following questions:

1)

about the guy on the right, did he turn the machine on?"

"Let's talk
"Why?"

2) "Did he flip any switches?" 3) "Then what happened to him?" 4) "How
did he act?

How did he look?" 5)"Do you think he intended to

do it?"

6 ) "Well, I

want to find out how responsible you think Tom is

forwhat

happened.

If we

could imagine a scale of responsibility from oneto

ten with one being not responsible and ten being completely respon
sible, where would you place Tom on that scale?
experimenter?"
bystander.

The other guy?

The

The assistant then asked specific questions about the

7) "Did he see what Tom was doing?" "How did he look?"

8 ) Was he hurt? and 9) "If there are medical costs or expenses to
repair the equipment, what percentage of the total costs do you think
Tom should pay?", "The other guy should pay?", "The experimenter should
pay? '
After the subject had answered these specific questions he was
debriefed.

Both the experimenter and the assistant informed the

subject of the true nature of the experiment and answered any questions
asked by the subjects.

RESULTS

Person Perception
The person perception data was analyzed using a repeated
measures analysis of variance with a 2 x 2 x 2 (Severity of Outcome x
Accident Victim x Sex) factorial arrangement of treatments on the whole
plot with one split plot factor, the stimulus person who was rated
(Rating).

This computer program developed by Barr and Goodnight

(1971) generated exact probabilities for each F-test.

A Duncan

Multiple Range Test was performed on all pairs of the means involved
in the significant interactions.
One question of interest in this study was whether or not the
observers would differentially rate the innocent bystander and the
actor who perpetrated the accident.

In order to provide an overall

test of this question the scores on four bi-polar items which directly
measured affect toward the stimulus persons were pooled.

This measure

was composed of the following affect items; Good-Bad, LikeableUnlikeable, Pleasant-Unpleasant, and Desirable-Undesirable.

A highly

significant rating main effect (F=6.45; 1 and 72 d.f.; p=.0122) indi
cated that across all experimental conditions the bystander was per
ceived significantly more favorably than the actor on this pooled
measure of person perception.

In order to test for the consistency of

this Rating main effect the individual person perception items were then
analyzed.
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The analysis of the individual person perception items yielded
the same highly significant and consistent pattern as the pooled
person perception variables (Table 1).

The actor who perpetrated the

accident was perceived as less cooperative, less good, less pleasant,
less lucky, less kind, less helpful, less benevolent and as less
careful than the bystander.

However, on the event related items more

directly related to the situation the actor was perceived as more
aggressive, more active and as more curious than the bystander.

The

only positive characteristic attributed to the actor was attractive
ness.

While the actor was rated as more attractive than the bystander,

this finding was interpreted to reflect differences in the actual
physical appearance of the stimulus persons.

These highly signifi

cant and consistent differences in the perception of the stimulus
persons indicated that the observers did differentially rate the actor
and the bystander.
A second question of interest was whether or not the severity
of outcome would effect the observers perceptions of the stimulus
persons.

Based on Lerner's just world hypothesis it was predicted

that the observers would perceive both the actor and the bystander less
favorably in the severe outcome condition than in the mild outcome con
dition.

However, the results of the Severity of Outcome main effects

were not significant for any of the person perception variables.
Apparently, in this study, increased suffering to the actor and to the
bystander did not threaten the observer's belief in a just world and
did not lead to derrogation of the stimulus persons.
hypothesis was not supported.

Therefore, this
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TABLE 1
MEAN RATINGS OF ACTOR AND BYSTANDER ON
PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURES*

Variable

Actor

Bystander

p

Pooled

25.18

26.50

.0122

Cooperative

7.21

7.78

.0083

Good

6.26

6.91

.0005

Aggressive

7.10

6.40

.0839

Pleasant

6.53

7.11

.0034

Kind

6.03

6.70

.0006

Active

7.30

6.80

.1253

Lucky

4.90

4.40

.1465

Attractive

6.12

5.31

.0005

Curious

7.55

6.02

.0002

He lpful

6.79

7.59

.0122

Benevolent

5.93

6.53

.0149

Careful

5.01

6.58

.0002

Note.-All person perception measures in this experiment were 9-unit
sea les.
* Higher score indicates more favorable impression.
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While there were no significant differences produced by the
severity of outcome manipulation a Rating x Severity of Outcome inter
action did approach significance on the item of Careful-Careless
(F=3.68; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0558).

A post anova test performed on

this interaction indicated that while the observers did not signifi
cantly alter their perceptions of the bystander across the severity
conditions, they did perceive the actor as being significantly more
careful when the outcome was severe than when the outcome was mild
(Diff.= 1.20; p. <.05).
A question of primary interest was whether or not who was
injured (actor or bystander) would effect the observer's perceptions
of the stimulus persons.

It was expected that when the actor's

behavior resulted in injury to the bystander, observers would perceive
this as an unjust situation since the bystander had done nothing to
merit this fate.

Therefore, it was predicted that observers would

come to terms with this unjust situation by derrogating the bystander
and view him less favorably than when he was not injured.
In addition, assuming that a just world situation applied to
the actor, it was predicted that observers might also derrogate the
actor when he injured the bystander since his behavior produced the
unjust situation.
A highly significant Accident Victim x Rating interaction (F=
8.69; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0046) for the pooled person perception mea
sures indicated that who was injured did effect the observers percep
tions of the stimulus persons (Table 2).

However, the results of the
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TABLE 2
MEAN RATING OF ACTOR AND BYSTANDER AS A
FUNCTION OF ACCIDENT TYPE*

Variable

Actor Hurts Self

Actor Hurts Other

Bystander

Bystander

Actor

Actor

P-

26.3

26.5

26.8

24.0

.0046

Cooperative

7.8

7.7

7.8

6.8

.0199

Good

6.8

6.5

7.0

6.0

.0184

Pleasant

6.9

6.8

7.3

6.3

.0241

Creative

6.2

6.7

6.3

5.9

.0997

Lucky

5.9

4.6

4.8

5.3

.0056

Desirable

5.5

6.0

5.4

5.3

.0236

Careful

7.0

6.7

6.3

5.4

.0650

Pooled

* Higher score indicates more favorable perception.
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post anova test performed on all the pairs of means involved in the
significant interaction indicated that there were no significant
differences between the observers perceptions of the bystander across
the accident victim conditions.

This finding indicated that observers

did not view the bystander less favorably when he was injured than
when he was not injured.

Therefore,the hypothesis predicting derroga-

tion of the bystander when he was injured was not supported.
On the other hand, the results of the post anova test indicated
that the observers derrogated the actor and viewed him significantly
less favorably when he hurt the bystander than when he hurt himself
(Diff. = 2.30; p. <".01).

Thus, this finding supported the prediction

of derrogation of the actor when he injured the bystander.
The analysis of the Accident Victim x Rating interactions for
the individual person perception items yielded the same highly signif
icant and consistent pattern as the pooled person perception variables.
That is, when the actor injured the bystander he was perceived as
significantly less cooperative, less good, less creative, less desir
able and as less careful than when he hurt himself.

These results

further supported the hypothesis that the actor would be derrogated and
viewed less favorably when he hurt the bystander than when he hurt
himseIf.
The Lucky-Unlucky item did not follow this pattern.

On this

measure the actor was rated as most lucky when he hurt the bystander
and as least lucky when he hurt himself.

On the other hand, the by

stander was rated as most lucky when the actor hurt himself and as least
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lucky when he was hurt.

Thus, each stimulus person was rated as most

lucky when the other stimulus person was injured.
Although there were no specific hypotheses regarding the vari
able of sex, a significant Severity of Outcome x Accident Victim x Sex
interaction (F=8.68; 1 and 72 d.f,; p.=.0433) indicated that the sex
of the observer interacted with the perceptions of the stimulus persons.
The results of the post anova test performed on all the pairs of
means involved in the significant interaction indicated that the
female observers were relatively unaffected either by the severity of
outcome or by who was hurt.

On the other hand, while male observers

did not significantly differ in their perceptions of the stimulus per
sons in the severe outcome conditions, there were significant differ
ences in their perceptions of the stimulus persons when the outcome
was mild,

(Figure 1).

Specifically, when the actor hurt himself

mildly, both stimulus persons were perceived most favorably.

However,

when the actor hurt the innocent bystander mildly, both stimulus persons
were derogated and viewed less favorably than when the actor hurt him
self mildly (Diff.=1.30; p

.05).

While the reverse relationship was

observed in the severe, outcome condition, the differences between the
means were not significant.

Attribution of Responsibility
The responsibility data were analyzed using a repeated measures
analysis of variance with a 2 x 2 x 2 (Severity of Outcome x Accident
Victim x Sex) factorial arrangement of treatments on the whole plot and
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one factor, stimulus person rated (Rating) on the split plot.

In

addition, the responsibility data were further analyzed separately with
a completely randomized design with a 2 x 2 x 2 (Severity of Outcome x
Accident Victim x Sex) factorial arrangement of treatments for each
stimulus person rated (actor, bystander, or experimenter).

A Duncan

Multiple Range Test was performed on all pairs of means involved in the
significant interactions.
The question of primary importance in this study focused on how
observers would attribute responsibility to those persons potentially
at fault for the accident.

A highly significant Rating main effect

(F=18.63; 2 and 144 d.f.; p.=.0001) revealed that over all conditions
observers attributed the greatest amount of responsibility to the actor
who perpetrated the accident (X=7.47), the next greatest amount of
responsibility was attributed to the experimenter (X=2.62), and the
least amount of responsibility was attributed to the innocent bystander
(X=1.60).

The results of the post anova test indicated that the mean

of responsibility attributed to the actor differed significantly from
the mean of responsibility attributed to the experimenter (Diff.=4.85;
p. <.001).

Also, the mean of responsibility attributed to the experi

menter differed significantly from the mean of responsibility attributed
to the bystander (Diff.=1.02; p.<.05).

These results are presented in

Table 3.
Based upon Walster's formulation of self-protective attribution
of responsibility it was predicted that observers would attribute more
responsibility to the actor and to the bystander when the outcome of
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TABLE 3

MEAN RESPONSIBILITY ATTRIBUTED TO THE STIMULUS
PERSONS AS A FUNCTION OF THE
SEVERITY OF THE OUTCOME*

Mi Id
Outcome

Severe
Outcome

X

Bystander

1.33

1.88

1.60

Actor

8.05

6.90

7.47

Experimenter

1.50

3.03

2.62

* Higher value indicates greater responsibility.
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the accident was severe than when the outcome was mild.

While the

observers did attribute a greater amount of responsibility to the by
stander in the severe outcome condition than in the mild outcome condi
tion the differences in attributed responsibility did not approach
significance.

Thus, the hypothesis predicting responsibility attribu

tion to the bystander was not supported.
A significant Severity of Outcome main effect for the actor
(F=4.00; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0464) indicated that the observers attri
buted significantly more responsibility to the actor when the outcome
was mild than when the outcome was severe.

This result is directly

opposite to the prediction based on Walster's formulation.
In addition., by extending Walster's formulation it was predicted
that observers would attribute more responsibility to a third party
(the experimenter) in the severe outcome condition than in the mild
outcome condition.

A highly significant Severity of Outcome main

effect (F=6.80; 1 and 72 d.f.; p.=.0107) indicated that observers
attributed significantly more responsibility to the experimenter as the
consequences of the accident become more severe.

Thus, Walster's

hypothesis was not supported for the actor but was supported when
observers rated the third party (i.e., the experimenter).

Eyewitness Account
A preliminary analysis of the tape recorded eyewitness descrip
tions of the accident revealed a number of tentative findings.

Based

on a previous study conducted by Costelloe and Prestholdt (1973) it
was predicted that when the outcome of the accident was severe, observers
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would provide the interviewers with more accurate and more detailed
descriptions of the events surrounding the accident.

However, in the

present study this hypothesis was not supported.
After witnessing the mild outcome conditions the observers
calmly provided the interviewer with a very detailed and accurate
description of the sequence of events which lead up to the accident.
Most observers reported that the actor turned on the equipment and they
accurately indicated the number of switches that the actor flipped.
Consistent with the attribution of responsibility data, observers in
this condition reported that the actor was responsible for the accident
and most observers reported that he intended to examine the equipment.
On the other hand, when the consequences were severe, the
observers appeared excited and nervous.

They spoke quickly and omitted

more of the important events which led up to the accident than did
observers in the mild outcome condition.

They reported that, "It all

happened so fast I can't remember what happened!"
member if the actor turned on the equipment.

They could not re

Thus, observers in the

severe outcome conditions may have been attempting to avoid possible
blame for the accident by "forgetting" what happened or by not reporting
important details.
In addition, it appears that the stimulus person who was hurt
may have had effects upon the observer's eyewitness account.

When

the actor injured himself the observers showed a great deal of concern
for him.

This behavior was consistent with the results of the person

perception data which indicated that observers perceived the actor more
favorably when he injured himself.
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On the other hand, when the actor injured the innocent by
stander the observers did not like the actor and they moralized about
what a bad person he was especially when the actor injured the by
stander severely.

For example, observers stated, "I can't believe he

did that" or "I can't believe that guy is in college."

Thus, while

these findings are tentative, they do appear to be consistent with,
and provide greater insight into, the results obtained on the person
perception and attribution of responsibility data.

DISCUSSION

The results of this study were generally consistent with the
notion that an observer is motivated to engage in cognitive processes
which enable him to "explain" or make sense of the occurrence of an
accident.

At the same time, findings were obtained which indicated

that a reexamination of these formulations may be necessary.

Attribution of Responsibility
Walster has proposed that while an observer may feel sympathe
tic toward a person involved in a mild accident, attributing his plight
to chance, he will not be so inclined when the outcome is severe.

For

a perceiver to attribute a serious accident to chance implies that an
accident of equal magnitude could perhaps happen to him.

Alterna

tively, by blaming the persons potentially at fault the observer can
reassure himself that a similar accident will not befall him.

Thus,

Walster proposed the hypothesis that greater responsibility will be
attributed to those persons potentially at fault for an accident when
the outcome is severe than when the outcome is mild.
However, this hypothesis was not supported for the two primary
stimulus persons since increasing the severity of outcome did not
reliably produce increments in attributed responsibility.

In fact, it

was found that observers attributed significantly less responsibility
to the actor in the severe outcome condition ilutn in the mild outcome
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condition.

This finding directly contradicted Walster's formulation

of self-protective attribution of responsibility.
Furthermore, since the accident in this study involved two
stimulus persons, it was expected that observers might also perceive
the bystander as being potentially at fault and therefore attribute
greater responsibility to him when the outcome was severe.

While the

means of responsibility attributed to the bystander were in the predicted
direction they did not significantly differ across outcome conditions.
Thus, this finding again failed to support Walster's formulation of
self-protective attribution of responsibility.
However, Walster's hypothesis did receive some support when we
look at the responsibility attributed to a third party who was not
directly involved in the accident but was potentially at fault.

Here

it was found that more responsibility was attributed to a third party
(the experimenLer) in the severe outcome condition than in the mild out
come condition.
This finding raised the possibility that in studies which have
failed to obtain results consistent with Walster's formulation of selfprotective attribution of responsibility some third party not directly
involved in the accident may have been perceived as ultimately respon
sible.

This may have been the reason that subjects did not differen

tially attribute responsibility to the stimulus person across severity
of outcome conditions in previous studies.
One example of this may be found in the third experiment of
Shaver's study.

He found that observers did not differentially
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attribute responsibility to the stimulus person even though there were
significant differences in the perceived severity of outcome.

Shaver's

results indicated that subjects did not attribute more responsibility
to the metals technician when his actions resulted in a serious outcome
(the loss of a child's eyesight) than when his actions resulted in a
mild outcome (the child's wrist was injured).

In this situation the

observers may actually have perceived the technician's supervisor, or
the company which manufactured the equipment as a third party poten
tially at fault for the accident.

The subjects may have attributed

greater responsibility to these third parties in the severe outcome
condition than in the mild outcome condition, but Shaver failed to
collect this information.
Overall, then, Walster's hypothesis was not supported for the
bystander, and it was reversed for the actor, but some support was
found when observers rated the third party.

This pattern of results

suggested that the attribution of responsibility data may be explained
more satisfactorily within the context of Shaver's formulation of
defensive attribution.
While Walster has proposed that an observer will attribute
greater responsibility to a stimulus person when the outcome of an
accident is severe than when the outcome is mild, Shaver has reformu
lated this reasoning.

He proposed that an important variable which

effects the attribution of responsibility is the degree of similarity
between the observer and the stimulus person.

Specifically, Shaver

proposed that when the degree of similarity is low, the observer can
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differentiate himself from the stimulus person by reasoning, "I am a
different kind of person than he is and I would have acted uifferently
in that situation."

Under these conditions he proposed that the

observer will attribute responsibility to the stimulus person.
On the other hand, he proposed that when the degree of simi
larity between the observer and the stimulus person is high,it is
difficult for the observer to differentiate himself from the stimulus
person.

If the observer attributed responsibility to a similar

stimulus person it would carry the implication that if he had been the
actor, observers would also attribute responsibility to him.

Thus,

Shaver proposed that under "similar" conditions observers would
attribute less responsibility and ascribe greater degrees of careful
ness to the stimulus person.

In other words, the observer reasons,

"I am similar to him; therefore, he is not responsible because he is
careful, just like I am."

This notion was supported by McKillip and

Posovac who demonstrated that less responsibility and greater degrees
of carefulness were attributed to a "similar" stimulus person than to
a "dissimilar" stimulus person in the severe outcome condition of their
study.
Since the observers in the present study were told that the
subjects they were to observe had also been recruited from other intro
ductory psychology classes the degree of perceived similarity between
the observers and the stimulus persons may have been higher than the
degree of perceived similarity between the observer and the experi
menter.

The results of the attribution of responsibility data, then,
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are consistent with Shaver's formulation since the observers attributed
less responsibility and greater degrees of carefulness to a similar
stimulus person (the actor), but attributed more responsibility to a
dissimilar stimulus person (the experimenter) when the outcome of the
accident was severe.
The results of the eyewitness accounts of the accident also
suggested that the actor was perceived as "similar" and that the third
party was perceived as "dissimilar," since for the actor observers
stated, "He's only a freshman, he didn't know any better" or "I'm sure
he didn't know what he was doing."

On the other hand, in reference to

the third party observers stated, "He's older, he should have known
better" or "He should have known this would happen" or "He should have
put a sign on the equipment" and "If that's his equipment he should
have known not to leave it plugged in."

Apparently, the observers

were trying to protect the similar stimulus person from possible blame.
If the observer did attribute responsibility to the similar stimulus
person, it would carry the implication that if the observer had been
the actor, other observers would hold him responsible.
Thus, the results of the responsibility data suggested that
self-protective attribution of responsibility may be employed by ob
servers as a means of "explaining" the occurrence of an accident under
conditions in which the observer is able to differentiate himself from
the potential perpetrator (stimulus person).

Furthermore, the results

suggested that this is likely to happen when the person potentially at
fault is a third party

not directly involved in the accident.

At the
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same time, the results suggested that under conditions in which the
observer is unable to differentiate himself from the potential perpe
trator, he may attribute less responsibility and greater degrees of
carefulness to the stimulus person when the outcome of an accident is
severe.

Person Perception
The results of the person perception data must be interpreted
more carefully, since Lerner's just world hypothesis served to guide
rather than specify the predictions of this study.

Specifically,

Lerner has proposed that when an observer cannot ascribe some misdeed
to a suffering victim he will attempt to maintain his belief in a just
world by persuading himself that the victim deserved his fate by
virtue of being a bad, undesirable person.
Since the bystander had engaged in no misdeed and had done
nothing to merit his injury it was expected that observers would come
to terms with this unjust situation by derrogating him and perceiving
him less favorably than when he was not injured.

However, the results

indicated that whether or not the bystander was injured, no significant
differences in the observer's perceptions of him were found.

This

finding was surprising, since the condition in which the bystander was
injured closely replicated the procedure employed by Lerner.
By extending the just world hypothesis it was expected that
when the actor hurt the bystander observers would also derrogate the
actor, since he was the one who created the unjust situation.

The sig

nificant effect that was found when the actor injured the bystander
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supported this hypothesis.

That is, observers perceived the actor

less favorably when he injured the bystander than when he injured him
self.

The analysis of the eyewitness accounts provided some insight

into how the observers were perceiving the actor when he injured the
bystander.

While the observers expressed sympathy for the bystander,

they made these statements about the actor, "I can't believe he did
that," and "I can't believe that guy's in college," and "I would never
do something like thati he's stupid."
The observers apparently perceived the actor as being respon
sible for the bystander's suffering, and this may have eliminated the
need to derrogate the bystander.

The observers may have been reason

ing, "He suffered not because he is a bad, undesirable person, but
because the actor touched that equipment."
derrogated, not the innocent bystander.

Therefore, the actor was

In fact, since the actor

engaged in behavior which resulted in injury to somebody in all condi
tions, he was derrogated more than the bystander overall.

Thus, the

presence of the second stimulus person who engaged in a misdeed elimi
nated the need for the observers to restore their belief in a just
world by derrogating the bystander.
The results of the present study identified interrelationships
between the various formulations which spell out reactions on the part
of an observer who witnesses an accident.

The findings of this study

suggested that an observer of an accident may engage in a number of
separate and distinct cognitive processes which enable him to "explain"
the occurrence of an accident:

(1) He can differeni_iate himself from
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the potential perpetrator, and attribute responsibility to that person
as suggested by Walster;

(2) If the perpetrator is highly similar to

the observer, the observer may avoid the attribution of responsibility
and ascribe greater degrees of carefulness to the perpetrator as sug
gested by Shaver;

(3) He can derrogate the victims and view them as

bad, undesirable persons who deserved their fate as proposed by Lerner;
or (4) He can misperceive the event, and thereby reconstruct the
accident differently in an eyewitness account.
Two implications for future research are noted:

First, the

responsibility attributed to the ’’third party” in this study suggests
that in future research measures should be employed which assess respon
sibility attributed to other parties potentially at fault.

Second, the

contradictory results obtained in previous research on the attribution
of responsibility suggested that "real life" situations may increase
the need to engage in attribution processes since the relevance of the
situation is increased.
The results of the present study also suggested that neither
Walster's formulation of self-protective attribution of responsibility,
nor Lerner's just world hypothesis provided an adequate explanation of
the results.

In addition, the effects of the similarity of the stimu

lus persons and the observer were not predicted on the basis of either
of these formulations and Shaver's notion had to be used as a post hoc
explanation.

It appears that in order to answer the questions posed

in this study further research is needed on the basic attribution
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process.

Specifically, studies are needed which investigate the

overall processes employed by observers to explain an accident in
addition to research which focuses on small segments of the overall
picture.
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APPENDIX A

NON-VERBAL CHECKLIST

TOTAL

Hands

Head

Nods yes (up/down) __________________________________

B

_______

Nods no (left/right) ________________________________ __________
Smiles _______________________________________________

_______

Frowns _______________________________________________

_______

Points with finger __________________________________

_______

Signals yes (come on) _______________________________ __________
Signals no (stop) ___________________________________

Upper
Body

A

_______

Leans Forward _______________________________________ __________
Leans Backward ______________________________________ __________

Other

Cues

Other Cues:

(

)

_______

(

)

_______

(

)

_______

(

)

_______

(

)

_______
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APPENDIX B
IMPRESSION FORMATION SCALE
Participant A
(circle 1)

COOPERATIVE
GOOD
LIKEABLE
AWARE
AGGRESSIVE
PLEASANT
KIND
ACTIVE
CREATIVE
LUCKY
ATTRACTIVE

B

UNCOOPERATIVE
BAD
UNLIKEABLE
UNAWARE
UNAGGRESSIVE
UNPLEASANT
CRUEL
PASSIVE
UNCREATIVE
UNLUCKY
UNATTRACTIVE

DESIRABLE

UNDESIRABLE

CURIOUS

INDIFFERENT

HELPFUL

UNHELPFUL

BENEVOLENT

MALICIOUS

CAREFUL

CARELESS
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APPENDIX C

TABLE 4
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR ATTRIBUTION
OF RESPONSIBILITY

Source

d.f.

M.S.

F

P.

Accident Victim (A)

1

0.50

0.93

.7588

Severity of Outcome (B)

1

5.70

1.05

.3085

A X B

1

0.74

0.13

.7199

Sex (C)

1

0.94

0.17

.6815

A X C

1

0.20

0.04

.8407

B X C

1

5.70

1.06

.3085

A X B X C

1

5.70

1.06

.3085

72

5.41

Rating (D)

2

828.33

114.57

.0001

A X D

2

15.25

2.11

.1228

B X D

2

36.65

5.07

.0076

A X B X D

2

2 .28

0.32

.7348

C X D

2

4.38

0.61

.5515

A X C X D

2

S. 48

1.31

.2719

B X C X D

2

4.28

0.59

.5598

A X B X C X D

2

5.10

0.71

.5002

Residua 1

144

7.23

Corrected Total

239

Subject (A X B X C)
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TABLE 5
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POOLED
PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURES

Source

d.f.

M.S.

F

P-

Accident Victim (A)

1

41.00

0.86

.6416

Severity of Outcome (B)

1

10.51

0.22

.6446

A X B

1

124.27

2.61

.1061

Sex (C)

1

4.56

0.09

.7557

A X C

1

26.41

0.56

.5352

B X C

1

3.31

0.07

.7886

A X B X C

1

195.81

4.12

.0433

72

47.47

Rating (D)

1

68.91

6.53

.0122

A X D

1

91.51

8.67

.0046

B X D

1

3.91

0.37

.5517

A X B X D

1

2 .55

0.21

.6500

C X D

1

28.06

2.66

.1033

A X C X D

1

26.41

2 .50

.1140

B X C X D

1

0.51

0.04

.8218

A X B X C X D

1

6.81

0.65

.5700

72

10.54

Subject (A X B X C)

Residual
Corrected Total

159

TABLE 6
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR INDIVIDUAL PERSON PERCEPTION MEASURES

Source

d.f.

Accident Victim (A)
1
Severity of Outcome (B)
1
1
A X B
Sex (C)
1
1
A X C
1
B X C
A X B X C
1
72
Subject (A X B X C)
Rating (D)
1
A X D
1
1
B X D
1
A X B X D
1
C X D
A X C X D
1
B X C X D
1
1
A X B X C X D
Residual
72
Corrected Total
159

V. 1. CooperativeUncooperative
M.S.
F.
p.
7.23
0.03
6.40
8.10
7.23
0.63
4.90
3.48
13.23
10.00
0.40
4.23
5.63
0.90
0.90
0.23
1.80

2.08
0.01
1.84
2.33
2.08
0.18
1.41

.1502
.9303
.1760
.1275
.1502
.6765
.2374

7.35
5.56
0.22
2.35
3.13
0.50
0.50
0.13

.0083
.0199
.6438
.1258
.0775
.5114
.5114
.7249

V. 2. Good-Bad
M.S.

F.

p.

1.23
2.03
0.63
5.63
0.03
1.23
2.03
4.58
16.90
6.40
0.01
2.50
0.90
8.10
0.10
0.40
1.11

0.27
0.44
0.13
1.23
0.01
0.27
0.44

.6130
.5154
.7141
.2709
.9395
.6130
.5154

15.10
5.72
0.09
2.23
0.80
7.24
0.09
0.36

.0005
.0184
.7635
.1356
.6237
.0087
.7635
.5589

V. 3. LikeableUnlikeable
M.S.
F.
p.
6.40
0.90
28.90
0.90
8.10
0.10
28.90
4.18
3.60
3.60
0.10
0.10
6.40
1.60
0.00
3.60
1.86

1.53
0.22
6.90
0.22
1.94
0.02
6.90

.2178
.6491
.0102
.6491
.1649
.8721
.0102

1.93
1.93
0.05
0.05
3.44
0.86
0.00
1.93

.1651
.1651
.8123
.8123
.0644
.6404
1.0000
.1651
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TABLE 6 (Continued)

Source

d.f.

Accident Victim (A)
1
Severity of Outcome (B)
1
1
A X B
Sex (C)
1
A X C
1
B X C
1
A X B X C
1
72
Subject (A X B X C)
Rating (D)
1
1
A X D
B X D
1
A X B X D
1
C X D
1
A X C X D
1
B X C X D
1
A X B X C X D
1
Residual
72
Corrected Total
159

V. 4. AwareUnaware
M.S.
F.
0.06
0.16
0.01
0.16
0.06
1.81
0.51
4.82
0.16
0.01
3.91
0.06
3.91
9.51
1.06
0.76
2.96

p.

0.01
0.03
0.00
0.03
0.01
0.38
0.11

.9106
.8518
.9702
.8518
.9106
.5494
.7456

0.05
0.00
1.32
0.02
1.32
3.21
0.36
0.26

.8138
.9624
.2532
.8858
.2532
.0737
.5592
.6208

V. 5. AggressiveUnaggressive
M.S.
F.
p.
0.10
4.90
1.23
2.03
8.10
1.60
0.63
3.88
18.23
0.90
6.40
5.63
2.03
8.10
8.10
2.03
6.08

0.03
1.26
0.32
0.52
2.09
0.41
0.16

.8674
.2640
.5828
.5207
.1492
.5299
.6920

3.00
0.15
1.05
0.93
0.33
1.33
1.33
0.33

.0839
.7033
.3090
.6590
.5735
.2508
.2508
.5725

V. 6. PleasantUnpleasant
M.S.
F.
p.
0.01
1.41
3.91
2.76
2.26
0.01
21.76
4.09
13.81
7.66
2.26
1.06
2.26
2.76
0.51
1.06
1.47

0.00
0.34
0.96
0.67
0.55
0.00
5.33

.9678
.5662
.6673
.5806
.5335
.9678
.0225

9.36
5.19
1.53
0.72
1.53
1.87
0.34
0.72

.0034
.0241
.2177
.5952
.2177
.1724
.5667
.5952
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TABLE 6 (Continued)

V. 7. Kind- Cruel
Source

d.f.

Accident Victim (A)
1
Severity of Outcome (B)
1
1
A X B
Sex (C)
1
1
A X C
1
B X C
A X B X C
1
72
Subject (A X B X C)
Rating (D)
1
A X D
1
B X D
1
A X B X D
1
1
C X D
A X C X D
1
B X C X D
1
1
A X B X C X D
Residua 1
72
Corrected Total
159

M.S.

F.

P-

8.10
0.63
3.03
1.23
0.23
3.60
2.50
4.62
18.23
2.03
2.50
0.40
0.00
10.00
0.03
2.03
1.26

1.75
0.14
0.66
0.27
0.01
0.78
0.54

.1864
.7150
.5736
.6143
.9397
.6161
.5291

14.45
1.61
1.98
0.32
0.00
7.93
0.02
1.61

.0006
.2065
.1599
.5819
.9955
.0064
.8834
.2065

V. 8 . ActivePassive
M.S.
F.
P3.31
3.91
1.81
3.31
5.26
0.06
0.76
4.19
11.56
0.16
1.06
0.31
6.01
6.81
1.41
0.65
4.90

0.79
0.93
0.43
0.79
1.26
0.01
0.18

.6193
.6611
.5204
.6193
.2653
.9040
.6756

2.36
0.03
0.22
0.06
1.22
2.39
0.29
0.01

.1253
.8531
.6490
.7989
.2715
.2410
.6005
.9114

V. 9. CreativeUncreative
M.S.
F.
P.
4.90
0.03
6.40
24.03
4.90
5.63
2.50
3.36
0.00
7.23
2.50
0.23
1.60
0.23
1.60
0.23
2.66

1.46
0.01
1.91
7.16
1.46
1.68
0.75

.2288
.9290
.1681
.0090
.2288
.1967
.6048

0.00
2.72
0.94
0.08
0.60
0.08
0.60
0.08

1.0000
.0997
.6631
.7692
.5535
.7692
.5535
.7692

O'
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TABLE 6 (Continued)

Source

d.f.

Accident Victim (A)
1
Severity of Outcome (B)
1
1
A X B
Sex (C)
1
1
A X C
1
B X C
A X B X C
1
72
Subject (A X B X C)
Rating (D)
1
A X D
1
B X D
1
A X B X D
1
C X D
1
A X C X D
1
B X C X D
1
A X B X C X D
1
Residual
72
Corrected Total
159

V. 10. LuckyUnlucky
M.S.
F.
p.
1.81
0.16
2.76
1.41
5.26
0.31
6.81
3.41
8.56
33.31
0.31
3.91
13.81
11.56
7.66
0.16
4.05

0.53
0.05
0.81
0.41
1.54
0.09
2.00

.5243
.8255
.6253
.5297
.2158
.7628
.1582

2.12
8.23
0.08
0.97
3.41
2.86
1.89
0.04

.1465
.0056
.7805
.6698
.06 54
.8915
.1698
.8390

V. 11. AttractiveUnattractive
M.S.
F.
p.
1.81
0.16
3.31
6.01
2.76
2.26
0.51
1.83
26.41
0.31
0.06
1.06
0.06
0.76
0.76
0.06
1.76

0.99
0.09
1.80
3.27
1.50
1.23
0.28

.6748
.7685
.1804
.0710
.2220
.2704
.6073

14.85
0.17
0.03
0.59
0.03
0.43
0.34
0.03

.0005
.6836
.8536
.5503
.8536
.5235
.5235
.8536

V. 12. DesirableUndesirable
M.S.
F.
p
7.23
4.23
9.03
3.60
0.90
6.40
6.40
5.03
2.03
5.63
0.23
2.03
0.10
0.40
0.10
0.10
1.08

1.44
0.84
1.80
0.72
0.18
1.27
1.27

.2326
.6347
.1813
.6951
.6770
.2620
.2620

1.88
5.23
0.21
1.88
0.09
0.37
0.09
0.09

.1708
.0236
.6534
.1708
.7591
.5509
.7591
.7591

TABLE 6 (Continued)

Source

d.f.

Accident Victim (A)
1
Severity of Outcome (B)
1
1
A X B
Sex (C)
1
A X C
1
B X C
A X B X C
1
72
Subject (A X B X C)
Rating (D)
1
1
A X D
1
B X D
A X B X D
1
1
C X D
A X C X D
1
B X C X D
1
1
A X B X C X D
Residua 1
72
Corrected Total
159

V. 13. CuriousIndifferent
M.S.
F
p.
2.50
2.03
0.90
1.60
2.03
2.50
13.23
4.53
93.03
0.90
1.23
0.10
19.60
1.23
0.90
0.63
5.37

0.55
0.45
0.20
0.35
0.45
0.55
2.92

.5335
.5128
.6614
.5611
.5128
.5335
.0879

17.33
0.17
0.23
0.02
3.65
0.23
0.17
0.12

.0002
.6863
.6396
.8869
.0568
.6396
.6863
.7336

V. 14. HelpfulUnhelpful
M.S.
F.
p.
1.60
12.10
3.03
0.23
3.60
0.90
4.23
3.38
19.60
5.63
1.23
0.00
1.60
0.63
7.23
5.40
3.00

0.47
3.58
0.90
0.07
1.07
0.27
1.25

.5006
.0592
.6506
.7929
.3061
.6136
.2564

6.54
1.88
0.41
0.00
0.53
0.21
2.41
2.14

.0122
.1715
.5316
1.0000
.5259
.6539
.1209
.1444

V. 15. BenevolentMalicious
M.S.
F.
p.
2.50
1.23
0.90
3.03
0.90
0.03
0.40
3.46
14.40
0.23
2.50
1.23
1.60
0.23
3.60
0.23
2.35

0.72
0.35
0.26
0.87
0.26
0.01
0.12

.5974
.5606
.6176
.6448
.6176
.9301
.7344

6.24
0.10
1.07
0.52
0.68
0.10
1.53
0.10

.0149
.7559
.3062
.5207
.5831
.7559
.2172
.7559

N>

TABLE 6 (Continued)

Source

d.f.

Accident Victim (A)
1
Severity of Outcome (B)
1
1
A X B
Sex (C)
1
A X C
1
B X C
1
1
A X B X C
72
Subject (A X B X C)
Rating (D)
1
A X D
1
B X D
1
A X B X D
1
C X D
1
A X C X D
1
1
B X C X D
A X B X C X D
1
Residual
72
Corrected Total
159

V. 16. Careful
Careless
M.S.
F.
0.00
9.03
0.03
1.23
2.03
10.00
0.40
6.46
99.23
18.23
19.60
1.60
3.60
6.40
2.03
0.03
5.32

P-

0.00
1.40
0.00
0.19
0.31
1.55
0.06

1.0000
.2393
.9492
.6684
.5840
.2149
.7996

18.64
3.42
3.68
0.30
0.68
1.20
0.38
0.01

.0002
.06 5 0
.0558
.5919
.5812
.2760
.5464
.9439

ON

u>
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